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Chapter pages in book: (p. 19 - 23)1. Gaps in the Explanation of Inventory Behavior
Inventories are a form of productive capital
and as such their size must depend on the
work that they are expected to perform.
Viewed at an omnibus level, this work de-
pends on the size of the vast aggregates of
goods that chum through the factories and
stores of the country. But viewed from within
those factories and stores, many things in addi-
tion to the volume of goods that are to be
processed and shipped determine the appro-
priate size of stocks; these include expecta-
tions about prices and other conditions in
the markets in which materials are bought
and finished products sold, availability and
cost of funds with which to finance stocks,
and all sorts of other things that influence
the cost of holding stock relative to the cost
of coping in some other way with the mana-
gerial objectives that stocks serve.
The many considerations that govern the
size that stocks ought to be are, like virtually
all determinants of economic behavior, expec-
tations rather than precisely current, precisely
known circumstances. Expectations typically
diverge in some respect from reality as it un-
folds. These divergences, too, govern the size
of stock at a given time. Actions governing
stock, then, depend on a web of expectations.
The behavior of stock depends also 9n how
expectations match the reality that comes to
pass.
But expectations depend heavily on infor-
mation; this is self-evident if economic be-
havior is "intendedly rational." In conse-
quence, a fruitful study of the behavior of
inventories must make a determined effort to
admit information to full view and concern.
In this sense the investigator copies the de-
cision maker.
Just how to achieve this ambitious objective
is hard indeed to say; the study struggles with
it at every turn. However, one approach is
dearly indicated: orders that are received and
placed by business enterprises, and the por-
tion of each that remains unfilled at any given
time, constitute an importantform and source
of information. In addition, unfilled orders
change the actual conditions under which
stock-carrying decisions are made. Outstand-
ing orders for materials afford a secondary
reserve of materials flowing toward the sales
end of a production chain. Unfilled orders
for the product a company sells-order back-
logs-influence the risk involved in buying ma-
terials farther ahead than usual, and thus the
advantage in holding materials stocks on hand
or on order. At very least, then, it is essential
to come to grips with the question of how
to deal with the relation between orders, un-
filled orders, and stocks in a meaningful way
in the context of business fluctuation.
These impressions point to questions that
have concerned economists for some time. The
inability of the sales-stock relation alone to
explain inventory behavior, and the value of
unfilled orders as an assistant in doing so,
are ideas that are not at variance with the
direction in which the empirical study of in-
ventories has moved in recent years. Without
attempting to be systematic, it will be useful
to highlight some of the major developments
of this line of thought and also to point to
some of the unanswered questions to which
itgives rise.20 QUESTIONS AND SOURCES OF EVIDENCE
THE INFLUENCE OF SALES
1 J•M. Clark, "Business Acceleration and the Law of
Demand: A Technical Factor in Economic Cycles,"
Journal of Political Economy, March 1917, Pp. 217—235.
2LloydA. Metzler, "The Nature and Stability of
Inventory Cycles," Review of Economics and Statistics,
August 1941, pp. 113—129. Metzler credits Carl Lund-
berg with the conception of the model that he develops.
8MosesAbramovitz, Inventories and Business Cycles,
with Special Reference to Manufacturers' Inventories,
New York, NBER, 1950. The extent of the difference
in the behavior of the two aggregates is interesting:
"The rate of growth in output reaches a high point
considerably before the end of expansion, a trough
considerably before the end of contraction" (p. 378).
This may be followed by a period of retarded change
and sometimes an additional minor movement: "The
movements of inventory investment are quite different.
The rate of accumulation of inventories istypically
low—usually negative—at the beginning of expansion.
And whatever oscillations it may experience during
Thomas Stanback, inspecting the richer ma-
terials of the postwar years, also found wide
variations in the behavior of change in sales
and change in stock.4
The extent to which inventories fail to be
explained by their association to sales can
be summarized by annual ratios of change
in output to change in stocks, in constant
Sales during the year are compared
with stocks at the end of the year to allow
for the lag previously The calcula-
tions indicate that stocks changed in the same
direction as sales in all but two of the years
from 1930 to 1953 (omitting 1942 to 1945).
The positive ratios ranged from 0.7 to 20.7;
the average was 6.4 and the average deviation
the course of the phase—annual data do not give any
indication of serious intra-phase fluctuations—it nor-
mally reaches its peak near the peak of the business
cycle" (p. 378).
4ThomasM. Stanback, Jr., Postwar Cycles in Manu-
facturers' Inventories, New York, NBER, 1962.See
particularly Table 36, p. 117. The timing comparisons
were quarter to quarter; the most inclusive data were
changes in final purchases (less services) and nonfarm
inventory investment; stocks of manufacturers, whole-
salers, and retailers were also each compared with the
relevant outputseries. The distributionof timing
comparisons was as follows:
Inventory Investment Com-









Total series turns 10 30
5Cf.R. P. Mack, comment to a paper by Franco
Modigliani, "Business Reasons for Holding Inventories
and Their Macro-Economic Implications," in Problems
of Capital Formation: Concepts, Measurement, and
Controlling Factors, Studies in Income and Wealth
19, Princeton University Press for NBER, 1957, p. 509.
0Thelag implicit in using stocks at the end of the
year appears to give the most stable ratios. The in-
cremental ratio reduces the substantial cyclical fluctua-
tion that characterizes the average ratio.
The point of departure for empirical analysis
was a theory which explained inventory in-
vestment in terms of a constant desired as-
sociation between demand and inventories.
J. M. Clark, in his classic formulation of "the
law of demand for intermediate products,"
focused on this underlying association and its
prolific implications.' The Lundberg-Metzler
formulation went on to show how the way
in which expectations could be formulated,
and the backwash of inevitable error on sub-
sequent events, flouted the achievement of
intentions.2 Nevertheless he formulated de-
sired inventory in terms of a fixed averagç
(and he added an alternative, incremental)
association with expected output.
As counterpoint to this elegant theme, em-
pirical examination of the evidence feltits
way. Moses Abramovitz' pioneer work with
the scant data of the interwar years revealed
a lag between change ininventories and
change in output. The lag itself did not con-
trovert the theory, but the irregularity of the
association was troublesome, and Abramovitz
attributed itto the different behavior and
different relative importance, at various stages
of the cycles, of the three levels of inventories:
finished, in-process, and "raw" goods.3
InclusiveThree Other
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was ±5.3. The implications of this wide varia-
tion in terms of the power of sales to deter-
mine inventory investment may be brought
out if actual year-to-year changes in stocks are
compared with what they would have been
had the incremental sales-stock ratio been con-
stant at the median value. Average actual
change was $3.6 billion; the errorofestimat-
ing change on the basis of the constant ratio
was ±$2.6 billion—72 per cent of the actual
change.
Obviously, then, in order to understand the
behavior of stocks, influences in addition to
a presumed constant association to sales must
be sought. Increasingly, in the past two dec-
ades, econometric analysis has been brought
to bear on this difficulttask. Different in-
vestigators have made different calculations
based on different But recurring in
recent studies are two themes which bear par-
ticularly on the general problem of meaning-
ful analysis of the role of inventory fluctua-
tion. One is the inclusion of unfilled orders
as an explanatory variable, the other the use
of distributed lags.
THE INFLUENCE OF UNFILLED ORDERS
The work of several analysts has shown that
unfilled orders help to explain inventory in-
vestment. Unfilled orders must have at least
some bearing on the changing expectations
about market conditions on which this mono-
graph focuses. But the difficulty with the find-
ings of a number of studies that I would like
to discuss is that unfilled orders are toohelp-
ful.8 Simple correlation coefficients relating
7Fora summary and analysis of a large number of
studies, see a very interesting article by Michael Lovell,
"Determinants of Inventory Investment," in Models
of Income Determination, Studiesin Income and
Wealth 28, Princeton for NBER, 1964.
SThebasic references in which the work here dis-
cussed appearsare:(1)PaulG.Darling, "Manu-
facturers' Inventory Investment, 1947—1958," A inerican
Economic Review, December 1959, pp. 950—963, and
(2) Darling, "Inventory Fluctuations and Economic In-
stability: An Analysis Based on the Post War Economy,"
Joint Economic Committee, Inventory Fluctuations and
Economic Stabilization, Washington,1961, PartIII;
(3) Michael C. Lovell, "Factors Determining Manu-
facturing Inventory Investment," Inventory Fluctua-
tions and Economic Stabilization, Part II, (4) Lovell,
"Buffer Stocks, Sales Expectations, and Stability: A
Multi-Sector Analysis of the Inventory Cycle," Econ-
ometrica, April 1962, and (5) Lovell, "Manufacturers'
Inventories, Sales Expectations, and the Acceleration
Principle," Inventory Fluctuations and Economic Sta-
bilization, Part II (reprinted from Econometrica, July
1961); (6) Nestor E. Terleckyj, Measures of Inventory
Conditions,NationalIndustrialConferenceBoard
Technical Paper 8, New York, 1960 (reprinted in In-
ventory Fluctuations and Economic Stabilization, Part
H);(7)Lovell, "Determinants of Inventory Invest-
change in unfilled orders to change in vari-
ously defined stock aggregates ranged, for two
investigations, from .82 to •34•9 Beta coeffi-
cients indicate that the explanatory power of
unfilled orders is roughly at a par with sales.
But the actual statistics used to represent un-
filled orders are heavily dominated by back-
logs of sales orders in the machinery and
transportation equipment industries, which
on the average contribute 70 per cent of the
total.'° It is difficult to see why unfilled sales
orders in these two industries should so heavily
influence stock forall manufacturers (plus
distributors in one investigation).
As to the explanation of the role of un-
filled orders, the several investigators partly
agree and partly differ." Darling emphasizes
ment" (see footnote 7), and (8) Ruth P. Mack, com-
ment on the preceding paper (ibid., pp. 224—231); this
comment is the direct source of most of the discussion
of the next several pages.
9Seenote 8, references1 and 3, and reference 8
(pp. 225—226).
10Thefigures are given in Ruth P. Mack, "Changes
inOwnershipofPurchasedMaterials,"Inventory
Fluctuations and Economic Stabilization, Part II, p. 86,
note 8.
Darling:"...inventoryinvestmentismore
closely associated in time with receipt of the order,
or more accurately with changes in the 'unfilled order'
backlog, than with the delivery (sale) of the goods to
the buyers. Indeed, the sale is an act of disinvestment
rather than a determinant of investment in stocks"22 QUESTIONS AND SOURCES OF EVIDENCE
two causal influences: firms buy when they
sell (when customers place orders), not when
they ship; buffer stocks need to be greater
when supply conditions tighten, which tends
to be when the rate of change in backlogs
is greatest. Lovell attributes the positive as-
sociation primarily to the fact that an in-
crease in backlogs anticipates an increase in
production, which dictates an increasein
stock. He agrees with Darling's first reason
insofar as he thinks firms like to buy when
they sell, as a hedge against shortages or price
change. Terleckyj agrees with Lovell's first
reason concerning the relevance of the link
between backlogs and production.
The influence of unfilled orders on stocks
has also been observed in time series without
benefit of econometric analysis. To mention
only one example, Stanback has displayed the
impressive parallelism among stocks of pur-
chased materials, new orders, and series that
reflect the speed with which materials are de-
livered and the delivery terms on which pur-
chasingagentsbuy.'2 These inturnare
closely similar to unfilled orders.'3 His ex-
planation is complex, but he seems to em-
phasize the changing supply conditions that
these figures feature—conditions that may be
based on limitations imposed by plant capac-
ity: "The influence of supply conditions may
operate in two ways during expansions: (1)
deterioration in supply conditions makes it
more difficult to achieve inventory objectives,
and the realized inventory investment will be
somewhat less than that desired; and (2) de-
terioration in supply conditions influences the
inventory objective itself." 14
Thesestudies indicate, then, that inventory
investment is, roughly, equally influenced by
unfilled orders and sales. At the same time,
the explanations proffered do not develop
agreement on the reasons why this should
be so, particularly in view of the lopsided
industrial composition of the statistics them-
selves.
UNEXPLA INED CHANGE
The problem is further complicated by what
the equations fail to explain. When the time
series themselves are compared, stock typically
lags sales or output. The lagged association
(note 8, reference 2, p. 30). To the selling firm, unfilled
orders give rise to "pipeline" stocks. Also, because of
competitive pressures in supplying markets, "the time
of greatest uncertainty for purchasing firms during
business expansions, and hence the period in which
their need for buffer stocks will be greatest, will tend
to coincide with the period during which the rateof
increaseof unfilled orders is at a peak." Accordingly,
changesinunfilledorders areintroducedtotake
account of "bufferstock"reactionstoactual and
expected conditions in markets, specifically, changes
in delivery period and in the reliability of quoted
delivery dates (ibid., p. 33).
Lovell: "If unfilled orders represent an established
demand, indeed a possible committal to deliverat
some future date, entrepreneurs may well consider it
advisabletocarryadditionalstocks when unfilled
orders are large as a hedge against possible shortage
and price commitments. In addition, a rise in the
backlog of unfilled orders may be expected to lead to
isgivenaninterestinginterpretationby
Richard Goodwin's notion of the "flexible ac-
celerator":firmstypically attempt onlya
partial adjustment of inventory toward its
an acceleration of production that is felt first in terms
of an increase of goods in process rather than a rise
in the output of completed commodities" (note8,
reference 3, Pp. 140—141). Lovell seems to disagree with
Darling's second reason: "Conversely, if unfilled orders
were only a surrogate measure for the tightness of the
markets on which firms purchase their inputs, a nega-
tive relationship between orders and stocks would be
revealed ..." (ibid.,p. 141).
Terleckyj:"One would expectthat when new
orders are running above sales, and the reservoir of
future business is built up, an accumulation of in-
ventories becomes desirable, as the planned produc-
tion rate rises to fill these orders. The subsequent in-
crease in the actual production rate entails a rise in
inventories concentrated in the in-process stocks" (note
8, reference 6, p. 21).
12Stanback,Postwar Cycles, Chart 9, p. 55.
13Ibid.,p. 50.
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equilibrium level in each period.15 'When this
construction is used, there is an equilibrium
level of stock—one which firms would not want
to change, once achieved—and this differs from
the actual level.
Michael Lovell reviewed a number of post-
war studies and calculated equilibrium levels
of stock, and what they imply about the extent
to which firms attempt to adjust inventories
to that level in a single period.16 If complete
adjustment were achieved, the "reaction co-
efficient" would be 1, but for two equations
for which the coefficient could be calculated
it was about one-half for an entire year or
about one-fifth a quarter, "...implyingthat
firms in manufacturing attempt to liquidate
roughly one-fifth of the discrepancy between
equilibrium and actual inventories each quar-
ter." 18 For his own effort to explain nonf arm
inventory investment, 1947—59, in terms of gross
national product, its rate of change, and un-
filled orders, Lovell calculated differences be-
tween equilibrium and estimated (or actual)
15 RichardM.Goodwin,"SecularandCyclical
Aspects of the Multiplier and Accelerator," in Income,
Employment and Public Policy: Essays in Honor of
Alvin H. Hansen, New York, 1948.
16 Note 8, reference 7.
17 The studies were by Lawrence A. Klein, who used
annual data, 1921—41, for which the reaction coefficient
as calculated by Lovell was .5. (Lawrence R. Klein,
Economic Fluctuations in the United States, 1921—Il,
Cowles Commission Monograph 11, New York, 1950);
and Darling, note 8, reference 1, pp. 5—6; cf. Lovell,
note 8, reference 7, pp. 183—184, and Mack, reference
8, p. 226.
18 Lovell, noteP. 184.
inventories quarter by quarter. These "surplus
inventories" averaged substantially larger than
the quarter-to-quarter change in actual inven-
tories, $1.7 billion compared to $1.0 billion,
ignoring signs in both cases.'9 They tended
to move in opposite directions, being negative
when investment is positive and vice versa.
What, one is moved to ask, is the meaning
of a business objective which is only one-fifth
achieved in the course of three months, or
one which results in nonintended stocks sub-
stantially larger than thetotal change in
stocks? At the least, "passive" inventory in-
vestment must be very large—far larger than
seems to make sense. Random disturbances
and mistakes also may be partly responsible.
In any event, very much a part of the pic-
ture are the assumptions, embodied in the
equation, concerning the requirements which
when satisfied produce equilibrium stock. If
unfilled orders 20 and demand do not in fact
largely determine inventory investment, then
"equilibrium stock," defined in terms of the
two variables, will not, except by chance, be
achieved. How realistic are the assumptions?
How, in fact, is inventory investment usually
determined? The next chapter aims to take
some tentative steps toward an answer by
looking at the business firm itself.
19 Lovell, note 8, reference 7, p. 187. I summed the
figures only through 1959, since the last two years were
extrapolations.
20 Klein's equation uses wholesale prices rather than
unfilled orders.